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This paper introduces a volume of collected papers on the political economy of environmental 
regulation:  economic analyses of the processes through which political decisions regarding 
environmental regulation are made, principally in the institutional context found in the United 
States.  Despite this geographic focus, many of the papers contain analytical models that are 
methodologically of interest and/or have lessons that are relevant in other parts of the world.  In 
the environmental realm, questions of political economy emerge along three fundamental 
dimensions, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct:  (1) the degree of 
government activity; (2) the form of government activity; and (3) the level of government that 
has responsibility.  The first three parts of the book deal respectively with these three 
fundamental dimensions of inquiry.  Part I features a set of six articles that examine how the 
targets and goals of individual environmental policies are established.  Part II brings together 
nine articles that employ the analytical apparatus of positive political economy to address 
questions related to the choice of policy instruments for environmental regulation.  Part III 
features four articles that examine — both positively and normatively — the level of government 
that is delegated responsibility for environmental protection.  Finally, in Part IV, three articles 
are featured that assess the use of economic analysis in contemporary environmental policy. 
 
  
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
 
Robert N. Stavins* 
 
 
The first task in assembling a collection of papers is to specify the scope of the volume.  
Although readers will agree about what is meant by “environmental regulation,” the meaning of 
“political economy” may be less clear.  Indeed, the meaning of this phrase has changed 
considerably over time (Oates and Portney 2003).  At one time, it denoted the entire realm of the 
study of economics, but since early in the last century it has come to refer to a sub-field, namely 
the study — from the perspective of economics — of the processes through which political 
decisions are made.  That provides a fair statement of the scope of this volume — economic 
analyses of the processes through which political decisions regarding environmental regulation 
are made, principally in the institutional context found in the United States.  Despite this 
geographic focus, however, many of the papers contain analytical models that are 
methodologically of interest and/or have lessons that are relevant in other parts of the world. 
In the environmental realm, questions of political economy emerge along three 
fundamental dimensions, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct:  (1) the degree 
of government activity; (2) the form of government activity; and (3) the level of government that 
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has responsibility. The first three parts of the book deal respectively with these three 
fundamental dimensions of inquiry.  Part I features a set of six articles that examine — from a 
political economy perspective — how the targets and goals of individual environmental policies 
are established.  Part II brings together nine articles that employ the analytical apparatus of 
positive political economy to address questions related to the choice of policy instruments for 
environmental regulation.  Part III features four articles that examine — both positively and 
normatively — the level of government that is delegated responsibility for environmental 
protection.  Finally, in Part IV, three articles are featured that assess the use of economic analysis 
in contemporary environmental policy. 
 
Setting the targets and goals of environmental policies 
 
The fundamental theoretical argument for government activity in the environmental 
realm is that pollution is a classic example of an externality.  Because firm-level decisions 
systematically fail to take into account full social costs, pollutant emissions tend to be greater 
than socially efficient levels.  As environmental quality is naturally under-provided by 
competitive markets, a possible role arises for government regulation.  Private negotiation will 
not internalize such externalities adequately without government intervention, and exclusive 
reliance on judicial remedies is demonstrably insufficient to the task.1  Since the time of the first 
Earth Day in 1970, which we may take as the beginning of the modern era of environmental 
                                                 
1Externalities in the environmental realm are not bilateral, but involve public goods with multi-party 
impacts.  Transaction costs and third-party impacts preclude the possibility of private negotiation consistently 
leading to simple, efficient solutions (Coase 1960).  For largely the same reasons, private tort litigation — with its 
considerable transaction costs — cannot solve the bulk of environmental problems. 
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policy, industrialized countries throughout the world have relied mainly upon a combination of 
legislative and administrative procedures to foster improvements in their natural environments. 
If it is appropriate for government to be involved in environmental protection, how 
intensive should that activity be?  In real-world environmental policy, this question becomes, 
“How stringent should our environmental goals and standards be?”  For example, in the United 
States, should sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions be reduced by 10 million tons, or would a   
12 million ton reduction be better?  In general, how clean is clean enough?  How safe is   
safe enough? 
Most economists would argue that economic efficiency — measured as the difference 
between benefits and costs — ought to be one of the major criteria for evaluating proposed 
environmental, health, and safety regulations.2  From an efficiency standpoint, the answer to the 
question of how much regulation is enough is quite simple — regulate until the incremental 
benefits from regulation are just offset by the incremental costs.  In practice, of course, the 
problem is much more difficult, in large part because of inherent challenges in measuring 
marginal benefits and costs.  
Over the years, policy makers have sent mixed signals regarding the use of benefit-cost 
analysis, which assesses policies on the basis of the efficiency criterion.  Congress has passed 
several statutes to protect health, safety, and the environment that effectively preclude the 
consideration of benefits and costs in the development of certain regulations, even though other 
                                                 
2See:  Arrow, Cropper, Eads, Hahn, Lave, Noll, Portney, Russell, Schmalensee, Smith, and Stavins (1996). 
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statutes actually require the use of benefit-cost analysis.3  But this has not prevented regulatory 
agencies from considering the benefits and costs of their regulatory proposals. 
At the same time as Congress has sent mixed signals regarding the use of economic 
analysis in environmental policy assessment, Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush 
all introduced formal processes for reviewing economic implications of major environmental, 
health, and safety regulations (using so-called Regulatory Impact Analysis).  Apparently the 
Executive Branch, charged with designing and implementing regulations, has seen a greater need 
than the Congress to develop a yardstick against which the efficiency of regulatory proposals can 
be assessed; benefit-cost analysis has been the yardstick of choice. 
Despite such arguments, formal benefit-cost analysis has only infrequently been used to 
help set the stringency of environmental standards.  The politics of environmental policy have 
favored a very different set of approaches to setting standards, such as that embraced by the 
Clean Air Act:  set the standard to “protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety.” 
Part I of this volume features six articles that develop and apply the tools of positive 
political economy to provide insights into how the targets and goals of environmental policies 
                                                 
3Statutes that have been interpreted (in part, at least) to restrict the ability of regulators to consider benefits 
and costs include:  the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; health standards under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act; safety regulations from National Highway and Transportation Safety Agency; the Clean Air Act; the 
Clean Water Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act.  On the other hand, parts of the Clean Water Act, the Consumer Product Safety 
Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act explicitly allow or require regulators to consider benefits and costs. 
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have been established, with particular attention to the U.S. institutional context over the period 
since the 1970s.4 
In the first article in Part I, Joseph Kalt and Mark Zupan (1984) provide an empirical 
analysis of “Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics.”  By the early 1980s, 
public interest theories of regulation, in which politicians were assumed to make decisions 
simply and exclusively to benefit the public, were already out of favor, having been replaced by 
“interest group” or “capture” theories whereby politicians were modeled as making decisions to 
maximize their own political support, typically as provided by interest groups within their 
constituencies (Downs 1957; Stigler 1971; Buchanan and Tullock 1965; Peltzman 1976).  In the 
context of the latter literature, Kalt and Zupan argue that the ideological preferences of policy 
makers, not just their constituents’ economic or other self interests, may also play a significant 
role in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes.  
Following Stigler (1972), Kalt and Zupan distinguish two types of utility that an elected 
official may be expected to seek:  utility derived from increased wealth or likelihood of re-
                                                 
4The six articles included in Part I of this volume are not intended to represent a comprehensive review of 
the literature in this area.  Among other works that are important are the following:  Stigler (1971) provided the 
original exposition of capture theory, which was subsequently formalized and extended by Peltzman (1976).  Becker 
(1983) followed by explaining political outcomes as the consequence of competition among interest groups, adding 
the wrinkle that such political competition could be efficiency enhancing.  In early empirical analyses, Crandall 
(1983), Pashigian (1985), Elliot, Ackerman, and Millian (1985) found evidence that self-interest could explain 
patterns of regulation, a view that received further empirical support from Hird (1990).  Hahn (1990) stepped back 
from empirical analysis to develop further the theoretical framework within which the political economy of 
environmental regulation could be considered.  More recent works have included Fredriksson’s (1997) model of 
how pollution tax rates are determined, building upon earlier work by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman 
and Helpman (1994), and a related empirical analysis by Ekins and Speck (1999) of implementation of 
environmental taxes in Europe. 
5 Resources for the Future  Stavins 
election  (the “investment motive”) and utility from acting according to moral or "ideological" 
beliefs (the “consumption motive”).  Stigler believed that the investment motive, satisfied by 
maximizing constituent support, would be vastly more important in understanding and modeling 
political behavior.  Kalt and Zupan challenge this, hypothesizing that imperfect “policing” of 
political representatives (agents) by their constituents (principals) might leave politicians room to 
indulge their own ideological preferences.5  Through a carefully-constructed econometric 
analysis of U.S. Senate votes on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, the 
authors find that although the capture model explains a considerable amount of the variation in 
voting patterns, Senators' ideological preferences are also highly significant.   
The second paper turns from Congressional voting behavior to agency rulemaking, and 
examines the factors — both those associated with special interests and those associated with 
perceptions of general welfare — that can explain public decision making in the environmental 
realm.  In “The Determination of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision 
Making,” Maureen Cropper, William Evans, Stephen Berardi, Maria Ducla-Soares, and Paul 
Portney (1992) find empirical support for the proposition that regulators take into account both 
special interests and general welfare when setting environmental standards. 
Although economic efficiency would require that standards be set at the level that 
maximizes the difference between benefits and costs, this is rarely the approach taken in actual 
public policy, and there has been considerable scholarly debate over how environmental 
standards are actually set.  Do agencies weigh benefits and costs, or are they driven by the 
demands of politically influential interest groups?  Do agencies take action when risks exceed 
                                                 
5Kalt and Zupan refer to a then-current debate about the empirical importance of public interest or 
ideological motives, citing:  Kau and Rubin 1979, Kalt 1981, Peltzman 1982, and Mitchell 1979. 
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certain statistical thresholds, regardless of costs (Milvy 1986, Travis et al. 1987, Travis and 
Hattemer-Frey 1988)?6  Cropper et al. (1992) analyze EPA’s decision making in an effort to test 
these alternative theories of standard setting.7 
In their econometric analysis of EPA’s decisions between 1975 and 1989 regarding the 
registration of pesticides, Cropper et al. (1992) test two main hypotheses:  (1) that EPA takes 
into account benefits and costs when setting standards, and so the probability that EPA will 
cancel the use of a pesticide is influenced by relative benefits and costs; and (2) that special 
interest groups representing business and the environment also affect the likelihood of 
cancellation decisions.  They find that EPA does appear to balance the risks of pesticide use 
against the benefits of continuation, but they also find that EPA places much greater weight on 
risks to pesticide applicators (farm-workers) than risks to consumers:  the implicit value of a 
statistical life is $35 million per cancer case for pesticide applicators, but only $60 thousand for 
consumers!  The authors do not find evidence supporting the “bright lines” hypothesis, but do 
find that political intervention by environmental groups and growers affects policy outcomes. 
The third paper in Part I stands back and considers the role of broader political 
institutions in setting environmental goals by comparing how the presence of authoritarian versus 
democratic government affects choices of environmental targets.  In “Political Institutions and 
Pollution Control,” Ronald Congleton (1992) posits a model of national decision-making related 
to environmental standards, and with it demonstrates that anticipated differences in parameters 
between authoritarian and democratic regimes affects national choices of pollution control.   
                                                 
6Such thresholds have been termed “bright lines.”  
7At the time of their writing, there had been only one other such ex post analysis of EPA decision making 
(Magat, Krupnick, and Harrington 1986). 
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Under plausible assumptions about regime preferences, Congleton demonstrates that autocrats 
place a higher relative cost on pollution abatement than democratic (median voter) regimes.  
Hence authoritarian regimes tend to choose more lax environmental standards.  Congleton 
carries out an empirical test using data on signatories to the Montreal Protocol, and finds general 
support for his theory. 
In the fourth paper in Part I, “Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation,” 
Andrew Metrick and Martin Weitzman (1996) carry out an empirical analysis of factors that 
affect U.S. government decisions regarding the protection of endangered species.  The authors do 
not specify a formal political economy model, but provide a reduced-form analysis of factors that 
affect government decision-making.8  Metrick and Weitzman posit two sets of explanatory 
variables:  “scientific” characteristics and “visceral” characteristics, the former including degree 
of endangerment and taxonomic uniqueness, and the latter including size of species and 
phylogenic class, intended to proxy for species’ status as higher forms of life. 
In their econometric analysis, the authors examine the effects of these characteristics on 
two major types of decisions:  (1) whether a species is listed by the Federal government as 
threatened or endangered; and (2) the amount the government directly spends on the recovery or 
preservation of the species.  The authors examine differences between observed patterns and the 
stated goals of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's own priority system, which is intended to 
guide listing and spending decisions.  Metrick and Weitzman find that the role of visceral 
characteristics plays a significant role in government decisions, with considerable favoritism 
being shown to the preservation of “charismatic mega-fauna” (essentially species that are cute 
                                                 
8This work can be seen as an extension of earlier research by McFadden (1975), Weingast and Moran 
(1983), Thomas (1988), and Cropper et al. (1992). 
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and large).  Although scientific characteristics are found to play a role at the listing stage, they 
are overwhelmed in importance by the visceral characteristics in decisions about spending.  In 
addition, the authors find that political factors (proxied by whether efforts to protect species have 
been in direct conflict with development projects) have had more influence on listing and 
spending decisions than is proscribed by the government’s priority system. 
The fifth paper in Part I — “The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good:  The Case 
of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol,” by James Murdoch and Todd Sandler 
(1997) — provides a game-theoretic analysis of worldwide reductions in CFC emissions in the 
late 1980s.  At its core, the paper develops a model of the voluntary provision of public goods 
and provides an empirical test of this hypothesis using data on CFC emissions prior to the 
beginning of official limits linked with the Montreal Protocol.9   
In their model, nations’ preferences vary according to their tastes, which are a function of 
factors such as income, geophysical characteristics, population size, and political regime.  The 
quantity of the public good (the ozone layer) is jointly determined by the decisions of each 
nation, and nations with higher incomes are assumed to contribute more to the provision of the 
public good.  The authors find that the variation in voluntary CFC reductions is explained largely 
by GNP, political and civil rights, and geographical latitude, and that emissions reduction 
patterns support their hypothesized model.  They conclude that the Montreal Protocol codified 
emissions reductions that countries would have provided voluntarily.     
                                                 
9Previous literature on the voluntary provision of public goods include:  Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 
(1986), and Cornes and Sandler (1984, 1996).  Previous applications of the “subscription model” of public good 
contributions include:  Andreoni (1988), and Andreoni and McGuire (1993). 
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The sixth and final paper in Part I is by Toke Aidt (1998), “Political Internalization of 
Economic Externalities and Environmental Policy.”  Aidt develops a theoretic model of the 
political economy of environmental regulation, based on the interactions of competing interest 
groups.10  The government maximizes its political support, which is  modeled as a weighted 
average of interest group contributions and constituent social welfare.  The analysis features a 
two-stage game, where interest groups first present a menu of political contributions (taking as 
fixed the contributions of other groups) contingent on policy choices.  In the second stage, the 
government chooses its policy (setting both the target and the instrument) to maximize its 
objective function.  Aidt’s contribution is to demonstrate that competition among interest groups 
results in policies that internalize environmental externalities, but that this political solution 
generally is sub-optimal. 
 
 
Choosing the instruments of environmental regulation 
 
Once the goals or standards of any given environmental policy are established (whether 
on political, scientific, economic, ethical, or any other grounds), policy makers are left to ask 
what form should government involvement take.  In other words, what means — what policy 
instruments — should be used to achieve the established ends?  Economists consistently have 
urged the use of “market-based” instruments — principally pollution taxes and tradeable permits 
— rather than so-called “command-and-control” instruments, such as design standards, which 
require the use of particular technologies, or performance standards, which prescribe the 
                                                 
10The common agency model employed by Aidt follows the approaches of Bernheim and Whinston 
(1986), and Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
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maximum amount of pollution that individual sources can emit.  At least in theory, market-based 
instruments are cost effective, that is, they can minimize the aggregate cost of achieving a given 
level of environmental protection, and provide dynamic incentives for the adoption and diffusion 
of cheaper and better control technologies.  Despite these advantages, however, market-based 
instruments have been used far less frequently than command-and-control standards. 
Part II of this volume features nine articles that apply positive political economy analysis 
to the question of how governments select particular policy instruments for environmental 
protection.  The first paper is a seminal one in the field, “Polluters’ Profits and Political 
Response:  Direct Controls Versus Taxes,” by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1975).  The 
authors follow the public choice framework in assuming that policy outcomes are determined by 
industry influence, rather than by pure social welfare considerations.  The major contribution of 
the paper is to demonstrate that firms will prefer direct regulation (emissions quotas) over taxes, 
offering a plausible explanation for the prevalence of command-and-control instruments, despite 
the known cost-effectiveness of market-based instruments.11  Quotas that restrict entry create 
scarcity rents, which firms may appropriate, while taxes reduce the value of a firm.12 
The second paper in Part II is a direct extension of  the Buchanan and Tullock (1975) 
model.  In “A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation,” Michael Maloney and 
Robert McCormick (1982) extend the earlier work by specifying the conditions under which 
                                                 
11In a widely-cited application of the approach taken by Buchanan and Tullock (1975), Ackerman and 
Hassler (1981) document the emergence of regulations that required power plants to install scrubbers. 
12Hahn (1990) notes that Buchanan and Tullock’s (1975) analysis is more narrow than the authors claim.  
They do not actually demonstrate why industry prefers standards over taxes in general, but why industry will prefer 
a specific type of standard over a specific type of tax. 
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firms benefit from quantity regulations.  Like Buchanan and Tullock (1975), they demonstrate 
how quantity restrictions create cartel-like situations, allowing scarcity rents to be captured by 
firms.  In particular, Maloney and McCormick derive conditions on the cost structures of firms 
and on the degree of regulation under which quantity regulations will lead to an increase in 
aggregate industry profits.13 
To explore the empirical validity of their theories, the authors test whether specific 
regulations did in fact enhance the profitability of regulated firms.  They employ data on firms 
affected by the U.S. Occupational, Safety, and Health Administration (OSHA) cotton-dust 
standards, and by court-mandated rule changes in air quality regulation.  Their examination of 
the rates of return in the stock market on a portfolio of firms in the relevant industries indicates 
support for their explanation of environmental regulation. 
The third paper in Part II is also an extension of Buchanan and Tullock’s (1975) seminal 
work.  In “Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy,” Donald Dewees (1983) analyzes how 
instrument choice affects certain groups (“concentrated interests”) who are expected to 
experience significant impacts as a result of a proposed policy.  He considers the effects on 
shareholders and employees of three alternative instruments:  an effluent standard (set as a rate 
of pollution per unit of output); an effluent charge; and effluent rights (essentially a system of 
tradeable permits). 
Dewees finds that both capital and labor suffer more from effluent rights or effluent 
charges than from uniform effluent standards.  Furthermore, charges and permits look even 
                                                 
13In addition, the authors note that some firms may lobby for regulation even if it does not benefit the 
industry as a whole.  Essentially, firms who can comply most cheaply with the regulation stand to gain a competitive 
advantage over higher-cost firms.   
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worse when compared with regulatory regimes that impose more stringent standards on new 
plants than on existing plants (so-called vintage-differentiated regulations).  This result — which 
is consistent with Buchanan and Tullock (1975) — does not hold under all conditions, and 
Dewees’ major contribution is to show for which conditions (with respect to factor specificity, 
initial allocations of permits, differential treatment of old and new firms) these results hold. 
The fourth paper in Part II represents a departure from the first three in its empirical focus 
and informal approach.  In “Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems:  How the 
Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders,” Robert Hahn (1989) provides one of the earliest and still 
one of the most frequently-cited reviews of experience with market-based instruments for 
environmental protection (with specific focus on tradeable permit systems and pollution 
charges).14  Hahn finds that actual practice has diverged considerably from the textbook 
instruments envisioned by theorists.  Further, he concludes that for this reason, the cost savings 
have not lived up to expectations. 
Hahn provides a variety of explanations for these departures, which include political 
economy factors that produce less-than-optimal design of instruments.  For example, he notes 
that the cost-effectiveness of tradeable permit systems is reduced by the presence of any barrier 
to trading activity, and many such barriers (linked with location, trading ratios, and property 
rights definitions) are best understood as the result of interest group pressure.  Hahn argues for a 
richer conceptualization of the political economy factors affecting instrument choice.15 
                                                 
14For a more recent review, see Stavins (2003). 
15He notes, for example, that whether standards will be preferred to taxes depends upon the precise nature 
of each set of instruments (Coelho 1976, Yohe 1976, Dewees 1983). 
13 Resources for the Future  Stavins 
In the fifth paper in Part II, “Taxes, Torts, and the Toxics Release Inventory:   
Congressional Voting on Instruments to Control Pollution,” James Hamilton (1997) raises an 
additional factor to consider in the political economy of instrument choice:  the degree of public 
scrutiny given to a particular legislative decision.  Earlier theories of the positive political 
economy of Congressional voting decisions held that the economic interests of members' 
constituencies and the ideology of constituents or members could have significant explanatory 
power (Ackerman and Hassler 1981, Crandall 1983, Kalt and Zupan 1984, Pashigan 1985, 
Yandle 1989).  Hamilton moves beyond this by noting that it is not just the final vote on a bill 
that is important.  Rather, earlier rounds of voting on amendments, which typically include 
choices regarding instruments, may be important but are unlikely to be highly visible to the 
public.  Hence, the Congressional votes on amendments are more likely to be influenced by 
concentrated interests with significant lobbying power, rather than broad constituent interests.16 
Hamilton's empirical test examines voting on amendments to the reauthorization of the 
Superfund law in 1985.  These amendments called for specific instruments in separate votes:  
information-provision; a targeted tax on chemical and petroleum producers to fund the program; 
and liability rules.  Through his empirical analysis, Hamilton finds broad support for the notion 
that votes on these instruments were more affected by concentrated special interests than the 
overall vote on the Superfund bill, in which broad constituent interests and ideology had greater 
effects.  He concludes that it is important to consider the type of vote and level of public scrutiny 
when examining Congressional decisions on environmental policy, including the choice of 
instruments. 
                                                 
16The notion of “rational political ignorance” has been attributed to Downs (1957).  Also see Arnold 
(1990). 
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In the sixth paper in Part II, “The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental 
Policy:  The U.S. Acid Rain Program,” Paul Joskow and Richard Schmalensee (1998) examine 
the factors affecting the allocation of permits in a marketable rights scheme.  In particular, they 
analyze the allocations for Phase I (1995-1999) and Phase II (2000-2009) of the sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) allowance trading program under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990.  They examine 
how the actual allocation differed from a number of allocations under hypothetical rules, and 
seek to explain the difference, drawing upon theories from positive political economy. 
Overall, Joskow and Schmalensee find that the allocation of allowances in the acid rain 
program suggests “both a more complex and more idiosyncratic pattern of political forces than 
one might expect from previous work on the political economy of clean air.”  While interest 
group politics, Congressional influence, and electoral politics all appear to have played important 
roles in the allocation process, the final distribution of allowances suggests that the legislative 
process is simply more complex than has been captured by available models. 
The seventh paper in Part II, “The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental 
Policy,” by Nathaniel Keohane, Richard Revesz, and Robert Stavins (1998), provides a survey 
and synthesis of the positive political economy of environmental policy instrument choice.  The 
authors begin by noting the great divergence in this realm between the recommendations of 
normative economic theory and positive political reality.  In particular, they highlight four 
anomalies.  First, despite the advantages of cost-effectiveness and dynamic efficiency associated 
with market-based policy instruments, these approaches to environmental protection have been 
used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and-control instruments.   
Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent for new than for 
existing sources (vintage-differentiated regulation), despite the well-known inefficiency of this 
approach.  Third, in the few instances in which market-based instruments have been adopted, 
they have nearly always taken the form of tradeable permits allocated without charge, rather than 
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auctioned permits or pollution taxes, despite the advantages in some situations of these other 
instruments. Fourth, the political attention given to market-based environmental policy 
instruments has increased dramatically in recent years.  
In their search for explanations for these four apparent anomalies, Keohane, Revesz, and 
Stavins draw upon intellectual traditions from economics, political science, and law.  They find 
that all fit quite well within an equilibrium framework, based upon the metaphor of a political 
market.  The authors develop their “market model” of the supply and demand of environmental 
policy instruments.  In general, explanations from economics tend to refer to the demand for 
environmental policy instruments, while explanations from political science refer to the supply 
side.  Overall, the authors find that there are compelling theoretical explanations for the four 
apparent anomalies, although these theories have not been empirically verified. 
In the eighth paper in Part II, “Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of 
Environmental Incentive Regulation,” Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1999) provide an 
analysis of instrument choice that emphasizes the principle-agent problems inherent in the design 
of regulatory mechanisms.17  In a world of perfect information, instruments are equivalent, but 
the realities of incomplete information necessitate consideration of contracting problems between 
the public and regulators.  Boyer and Laffont develop a formal political economy model that 
compares two stylized instruments:  a uniform standard and a more flexible instrument that 
varies the standard among firms.  In contrast with standard theory, they identify conditions under 
which the uniform standard is more efficient than the flexible policy. 
The ninth and final paper in Part II, “No Chance for Incentive-Oriented Environmental 
Policies in Representative Democracies?  A Public Choice Analysis,” is authored by Friedrich 
                                                 
17Previous work in this vein on the regulation of natural monopolies was by Loeb and Magat (1979). 
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Schneider and Juergen Volkert (1999).  This paper examines political economy explanations for 
the relative prevalence of command-and-control and market-based instruments, relying on the 
public choice approach. The authors find that it is difficult to implement market-based 
environmental regulations for a variety of reasons, including the following.  First, firms — which 
prefer command-and-control instruments, for the reasons put forward by Buchanan and Tulloch 
(1975) — have relatively great lobbying power because they can overcome collective action 
problems more easily than environmental interests.  Second, voters may not favor an 
environmental program unless they are well-informed about it, and incentive-based policies are 
more difficult to understand.  Third, politicians favor policies that get immediate results and 
postpone the costs (or make them less visible to voters), and command-and-control policies lead 
to more immediate results that voters can see easily, while making their costs less transparent.  
Fourth, bureaucrats responsible for implementing environmental policies prefer command-and-
control approaches because they give them a more important role, and allow them to maximize 
their own budgets and staff. 
 
Setting the level of government to be delegated responsibility 
Inseparable from the first two questions is this third aspect of the overall inquiry into the 
role of government in environmental protection.  What level of government should be delegated 
responsibility and authority:  local, state, regional, Federal, multinational, or global?  There is no 
single, correct answer.  Even from a relatively narrow economic perspective, the answer depends 
upon specific characteristics of individual environmental policy issues. 
What I have defined as the beginning of the modern era of environmental policy, the time 
of the first Earth Day in 1970, is also the beginning of major involvement by the Federal 
government in the United States in environmental protection.  At that time and since, three sets 
of arguments have been made in favor of a strong Federal role: (1) that in the absence of national 
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controls, states would compete economically by lowering their environmental standards in a so-
called, “race to the bottom;”18 (2) that many environmental problems are inter-state externalities, 
and as such cannot be efficiently regulated by individual states; and (3) that a set of other factors, 
many linked with public choice arguments, also indicate the necessity of strong, national 
supervision. 
Part III of this volume features four articles that examine the level of government at 
which environmental policies are developed and implemented. The first paper in Part III, 
“Environmental Governance in Federal Systems:  The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby 
Groups,” by Per Fredriksson and Noel Gaston (2000), examines the optimal level of government 
at which to make decisions regarding environmental regulation.  The striking claim of the 
Fredriksson and Gaston paper is that environmental regulation is independent of the level at 
which it is set.19  In their model,20 centralized and decentralized governance lead to equivalent 
environmental regulations. 
                                                 
18The view of inter-jurisdictional competition as beneficial received early support from Tiebout’s (1965) 
analysis demonstrating that people’s ability to choose their locations could result in the efficient provision of public 
goods.  Brennan and Buchanan  (1980) suggest that competition among regions may constrain the taxing power of 
public agents, forcing them to be more fiscally responsible.  On the negative side of the decentralization (or 
federalism) issue, important early arguments for the so-called “race to the bottom” are found in Break (1967), 
Cumberland (1979), and Cumberland (1981).  Other important analyses include Crandall (1983), Pashigan (1985), 
and Oates and Schwab (1988).  A recent overview of the literature is provided by Oates (2002). 
19The conclusion that the level of government authority makes no difference contrasts both with normative 
arguments for the need for Federal standards, such as to avoid a “race to the bottom” (Cumberland 1981), and with 
counter arguments that Federal regulations tend to be inefficient because of their inability to take into account 
regional differences (Burtraw and Portney 1991).  The conclusions also contrast with those of Oates and Schwab 
(1988). 
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At the same time, the authors recognize that there are important distributional differences.  
In the decentralized case, the full costs of regulation are borne by workers, whereas in the 
centralized case, the costs are shared by workers and the owners of capital.  The authors present 
empirical evidence that is consistent with their theory, including an analysis of voting behavior 
on environmental policies in state legislatures, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the U.S. 
Senate.  They find no significant differences in the level of support for environmental policies at 
the different levels of government. 
The second paper in Part III, “Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in 
the United States,” by John List and Shelby Gerking (2000), refutes the hypothesis that letting 
regions (states) determine environmental policies will necessarily result in a “race to the 
bottom.”  The authors carry out an empirical analysis that leads to two conclusions.  First, greater 
environmental quality in a state responds positively to increases in income.  Second, while it has 
frequently been argued that granting more power to states will result in a race to the bottom in 
environmental quality, List and Gerking do not find compelling evidence that environmental 
quality declined when states had more control over setting rules for environmental protection.  
Specifically, they examine the results of the Reagan era's federalism policies. 
The third paper, “Federalism and Environmental Regulation:  A Public Choice Analysis,” 
by Richard Revesz (2001), challenges the claim that environmental regulation should be carried 
out at the Federal (national) level because environmental interests are systematically under-
represented at the state levels.  Revesz develops his argument both theoretically and empirically.  
Like List and Gerking (2000), Revesz challenges the view that states are ineffective as 
                                                                                                                                                             
20Their political model is similar to the one developed by Aidt (1998), and follows Grossman and 
Helpman (1994).  Politicians maximize a weighted average of contributions and general welfare.   
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environmental regulators.  He demonstrates that there were significant accomplishments at the 
state level prior to the initiation of Federal activity in 1970, and that the states have continued to 
undertake significant environmental protection measures, including ones that go beyond Federal 
requirements.  He asks why some states are more aggressive in this regard than others, and 
argues that the most plausible explanation is that states differ in their preferences for 
environmental protection. 
Revesz is careful to point out that his conclusions regarding state-level environmental 
regulation do not imply:  that the states enact socially optimal (efficient) environmental 
regulations; that state environmental regulation is likely to lead to higher levels of national 
welfare than Federal regulation; or that state governments are subject to less serious public 
choice constraints than the Federal government.  Rather, his major point is that the arguments 
that are typically put forward in support of primary reliance on the Federal government for 
environmental regulation — such as those that claim under-representation of environmental 
interests at the state level — are themselves theoretically flawed and empirically incorrect. 
The fourth and final paper in Part III, “Strategic Interaction and the Determination of 
Environmental Policy Across U.S. States,” by Per Fredriksson and Daniel Millimet (2002), takes 
a different approach than previous researchers to examine the race to the bottom hypothesis.  The 
authors note two reasons why state-level environmental policies have been claimed to be 
inefficient:  the presence of transboundary pollution problems; and competition for capital.  But, 
as the authors note, such arguments assume implicitly the existence of strategic policymaking at 
the state level.  Thus, Fredriksson and Millimet set out to test the empirical validity of this 
assumption. 
The authors’ empirical strategy employs two measures of state-level stringency of 
standards in econometric analyses that seek to examine whether one state’s environmental 
standards are dependent upon the standards in other states.  Their finding, in brief, is that there 
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are strategic interactions, that is, states are influenced by the actions of their neighbors, but the 
weight of the evidence suggests a “race to the top,” not a “race to the bottom.” 
 
 
Assessing the use of economic analysis in environmental policy 
 
Part IV of this volume brings together three papers that assess the use of economic 
analysis in the development and implementation of environmental policy.  In the first of these, 
“The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy,” Robert Hahn (2000) examines the 
historical impact of economic thinking on environmental policy in the United States.  He 
observes that over two decades, interest has grown in market-based environmental policy 
instruments and benefit-cost analysis of proposed and enacted policies.  Hahn finds that 
economists have influenced environmental policy in three ways:  by advocating the use of 
particular policy instruments; by developing improved methods to analyze benefits and costs; 
and by analyzing the political economy of environmental policies. 
His overall assessment is that “despite a few notable successes, the influence of 
economists on environmental policy to date has been modest.”  While the economic approach 
has gained significant traction in the policy community, this has not translated directly into better 
public policies.  The reason is that real-world policy formulation faces severe political economy 
constraints, which affect both design and implementation of instruments and the process of 
economic analysis.  Because of this, Hahn argues that it is critical for economists to improve 
their understanding of the political constraints, so that they can help design public policies that 
are both feasible and more efficient. 
The second paper in Part IV, “From Research to Policy:  The Case of Environmental 
Economics,” by Wallace Oates (2000), is a retrospective analysis of the influence of economics 
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on thirty years of U.S. environmental policy. Oates notes that in the early years of environmental 
policy, economists already had well-developed theories of externalities, but these had little 
influence in the policy world.  Oates maintains that the economic perspective on environmental 
management had little influence on the major legislation of the early 1970s because:  first, there 
was no interest group for which economic prescriptions had much appeal; second, environmental 
economics was itself a new field and had not yet focused on the complexities of design and 
implementation of market-based instruments; and third, there was a general lack of 
understanding in the policy community of the economic approach to environmental protection.  
Subsequently, however, there was what the author characterizes as a “remarkable 
transformation,” both with regard to targets and with regard to instruments.  The system evolved 
from one which ignored costs and relied exclusively on direct controls to one which explicitly 
considers benefits and costs and gives considerable attention to market-based instruments.21 
The third and final paper in Part III, “Environmental Regulation During the 1990s:  A 
Retrospective Analysis,” by Robert Hahn, Sheila Olmstead, and Robert Stavins, provides a 
retrospective analysis of environmental regulation in the 1990s, examining environmental policy 
making during that decade from the perspective of economics.  The paper focuses on the Clinton 
Administration, and highlights important trends and changes in the impacts of economic 
thinking.  The authors begin with a review of environmental quality changes during the 1990s, 
and then focus their discussion around three themes: efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and 
distributional equity. 
                                                 
21Oates (2000) highlights the research contributions of Dales (1968) and Weitzman (1974) to increased 
knowledge of the potential advantages of tradeable permits, as well as Tietenberg (1985) for demonstrating the cost-
effectiveness of market-based instruments. 
22 Resources for the Future  Stavins 
First, they highlight the ways in which the role of efficiency as a criterion for assessing 
environmental and natural resource regulations was very controversial in the Clinton 
Administration, while efficiency emerged as a central goal of the regulatory reform movement in 
the Congress. Second, they examine how cost-effectiveness was embraced by both the 
Administration and the Congress in the 1990s as a criterion for adopting specific policy 
instruments. Third, they analyze how and why the decade witnessed an increasing role for equity 
concerns as a consideration in environmental policy-making.  They contend that both the 
efficiency and the cost-effectiveness criteria may be hard to swallow when the distributional 
impacts of regulation are highly skewed, and that the focus on equity in environmental policy 
debates is likely to intensify as the costs and benefits of regulation continue to rise. 
Thus, this volume brings together twenty-two papers that have contributed to the 
scholarly literature on the political economy of environmental regulation.  The publication dates 
of these twenty-two diverse papers range from 1975 to 2003, and the topics are spread across 
four areas:  setting targets and goals; choosing instruments; setting the level of government; and 
assessing economic analysis.  But all the papers in this volume have in common their focus on 
economic analyses of the processes through which political decisions regarding environmental 
protection are made. 
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